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Abstract
Tenure contract is criticized for curbing the incentives for spending effort after obtain-
ing the tenured status. Yet, the best faculty seems to work on a tenure contract, and
schools who employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contract to
their new hires. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive
tomore able freshlyminted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.
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Machlup (1964) describes four different types of tenure, starting from tenure by law
and ending by tenure by courtesy, kindness, timidity or inertia. While some schools do
not offer tenure contracts, they act towards their faculty as if they had a tenure contract,
and one can easily name an example or two of an underperforming faculty member in a
non-tenure school who is certainly not getting fired. The question is therefore: why do
schools impose on themselves the burden of the tenure contract if they can instead just act
as if they did?
Tenure by contract, unlike tenure by kindness, requires having the tenure-track posi-
tion. The pathway from tenure-track to tenure is different from the path from the non-
tenure-track1 to entrenchment because the evaluation of the tenure-track contract is inde-
pendent from the current job market position: for instance, many more people take part
in tenure candidate’s evaluations, from the high brass of the home university to outside
∗Popov: Queen’s University Management School, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast, BT9 5EE, UK,
s.popov@qub.ac.uk.
1In US, these are usually called adjunct professors or lecturers; in UK, these are called teaching fellows.
Hereafter, we will refer to these contracts as lecturers’ contracts.
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reference writers, who try to establish whether the candidate is above the school’s stan-
dard. The lecturer, on the other hand, can be replaced by a better-performing outsider; so
the decision of whether to keep the lecturer has a noisier threshold. I show that a freshly
minted PhD of high ability, even risk-neutral, when choosing between the tenure-track
contract and the lecturer contract, effectively behaves as a risk-averse individual; whereas
the PhD of low ability behaves as a risk-lover, and prefers the lecturer contract.
This explanation complements other economic arguments for tenure. For instance,
Alchian (1953) reasons that permanent employment might translate into lower salaries,
lowering the faculty costs for the university and for the society. Carmichael (1988) argues
that non-tenured faculty, not willing to nurture competition, will underreport the ability
of talented incomers. McPherson andWinston (1983) argues that narrow specialization of
professors in case of free hiring and firingwill require toomuch costly turnover compared
to less specialized industry. Brown (1997) reasons that tenure is natural to academic insti-
tutions because academics are the resigual claimants of the university’s product (see his
paper for a historical overview of development of the US education system).2 All these
reasons take the faculty body as fixed and given; my argument is based on the change in
the ability distribution of the incoming faculty.
These economic reasons complement AAUP’s Statement of Principles in 1940, which
outlined the tenure system to protect the faculty’s academic freedom (Ginsberg (2011) pro-
vides some excellent popular reading in the history of academic freedom abuse), but Ceci
et al. (2006) empirically questions the efficiency of the tenure system in this regard. Nev-
ertheless, Premeaux (2012) finds universal support for the tenure system in US business
schools. Criticism of the tenure system is abundant: others being equal, administrators
would like to have more rights to create more incentives for the professors. The contribu-
tion of this paper is to show that using tenure-track contract, administrators create incen-
tives for the right job market candidates to manifest themselves.
The Problem of a Freshly Minted PhD
Consider a problem of a freshly graduated PhD (hereafter AP) who chooses between two
offers. AP has an innate ability θ, and after 6 years of employment, he will be able to
demonstrate a signal of his ability q = θ+ ε, where ε is distributed with a pdf f(·), contin-
uous and positive onR, and a cdf F (·). AP knows his θ, but not his ε. AP chooses between
2McPherson and Schapiro (1999) surveys more papers for an interested reader.
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θ
qˆ
Ui(·) U1(θ)
U2(θ)
U1(θ) is concaveU1(θ) is convex
Note: the density in the picture is single-peaked, with peak at 0: f ′(0) = 0. This allows to make a more precise characterization of the areas discussed in Proposition 1: for
θ > 2qˆ − q,U1(θ) > U2(θ), and the reverse holds for θ < 2qˆ − q¯.
Figure 1: The Utility of the AP
offers from two schools and an outside opportunity, which provides a lifetime utility u¯.
The time discount factor to compare the payoff today with a payoff in 6 years is δ. Let the
utility of being a faculty member during the probation period be γ. AP is risk-neutral.
School 1 offers a tenure-track contract. After 6 years, AP will be evaluated: if his
signal q is above qˆ, he will get promoted to a professor position (lifetime utility of which is
normalized to 1), and otherwise his only option is the outside opportunity. Being a senior
professor is better than the outside opportunity (u¯ < 1).
Therefore, the utility from choosing the offer from School 1 is
U1(θ) = γ + δ
pass tenure review︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F (qˆ − θ)) +
fail tenure review︷ ︸︸ ︷
F (qˆ − θ) [δu¯] = γ + δ − δ[1− u¯]F (qˆ − θ).
School 2 offers a lecturer contract, that does not have a tenure-track confirmation rule.
In 6 years, the schoolmight encounter an alternative employee (from a different school, for
instance) whose signal of quality is q˜. If q < q˜, the school sacks the AP, and hires another
worker instead. The AP then will have to take the outside opportunity. If the alternative
employee is not too good (q ≥ q˜), the AP gets promoted to a professor position (utility
of which is 1), which is not challenged by outsiders because of the entrenchment. The
random variable q2 is distributed on [q, q¯].
Therefore, the utility from choosing the offer from School 2 is
U2(θ) = Eq˜
γ + δ AP beats challenger︷ ︸︸ ︷(1− F (q˜ − θ)) + Challenger beats AP︷ ︸︸ ︷F (q˜ − θ) [δu¯]
 = γ + δ − δ[1− u¯]Eq˜F (q˜ − θ).
We assume that all monetary payoffs in both schools are identical to be sure that all
differences in preferences of the AP are driven by the contract structure.
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Proposition 1. When E[q˜] = qˆ, high θ APs prefer School 1, whereas low θ APs prefer school 2.
Proof. Function f(x) has to increase for small x and decrease for large x to integrate to 1
while being positive to be a proper pdf. Because of this:
• When θ is high enough, function −F (qˆ − θ) is locally concave, and by Jensen’s in-
equality, −F (qˆ − θ) = −F (Eq˜[q˜]− θ) > Eq˜ − F (q˜ − θ).
• When θ is low enough, function−F (qˆ−θ) is locally convex, and by Jensen’s inequal-
ity, −F (qˆ − θ) = −F (Eq˜[q˜]− θ) < Eq˜ − F (q˜ − θ).
Picking a θ large (small) enough to be sure that the whole support of q˜, [q, q¯], is inside of
the concave (convex) zone of −F (qˆ − θ) finishes the proof.
This Proposition explains why best APs seem to be aiming at getting employed at
tenure-track jobs: when they know that their threshold is fixed, it is easier for them to
be sure that they will pass the threshold, no matter how high it is. This Proposition sup-
plies intuitionwhy it is extremely hard tomove from being a lecturer to being anAP: if one
agreed already to be a lecturer while clearly being able to secure a tenure-track position
in a similar school, that person has already signalled his belief in his own inferior ability.
Robustness More frequent challenges to the lecturer’s contract, as well as additional
challenges after 6 years of service, will increase the riskiness of that contract, making it
less attractive for able APs. The interim evaluations of the lecturers’s ability will be even
noisier: indeed, if an interim evaluation is less noisy, the administration can use that in-
terim evaluation signal instead of the signal in 6 years.
The payoff from the lecturer job being identical in all aspects (such as γ and u¯) to the
payoff from the tenure-track job is needed to make contrast more evident (in fact, in some
countries the salary of a lecturer is beyond the administration’s control). Obviuously, if
a job yields smaller payoff, it’s going to be less attractive, and lower demands for tenure,
others being equal, will make the jobmore attractive. If, after failing tenure review, the AP
can still try himself as a lecturer, the utility of being on a tenure-track job is weakly higher;
if the AP can use both offers sequentially, he is going to use first the one with higher utility
from the scenario of Proposition 1.
The assumption that the challengers’ abilities come fromabounded support goes against
the spirit of the proof of Proposition 1. Indeed, one would naturally assume that the AP
who makes a decision must have his ability θ ∈ [q, qˆ]. This makes it hard to pick θ high
enough so that the whole interval of possible thresholds is in the concave portion of the
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utility function. However, after grasping Proposition 1, one can immediately see that if the
distribution of challengers’ abilities come from a mix of a bounded support distribution
(“usual contenders”) and an unbounded support distribution (“unusual contenders”), the
ordering of U1(θ) and U2(θ) has to remain the same if the share of the unbounded support
distribution is not too large. AP in question might as well be an unusual contender!
Conclusion
One criticism of the tenure system is that it promotes mediocrity, by removing the ad-
ministrators’ ability to fire underperforming professors. Here I argue that tenure-track
contracts are more attractive to more able APs, others being equal, thus improving the
ability distribution of the incoming faculty. This complements the usual arguments for or
against tenure, which mostly concentrate on behavior after obtaining tenure.
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